Short answer: from 1 April 2026, IT and ITeS merged into one category at a unified 15.5% margin, and the eligibility threshold rose from ₹300 crore to ₹2,000 crore, with a five-year block for IT services. The margin fell and the door widened — but electing is still a decision, not a default.
What changed
| Before | From 1 April 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Categories | IT and ITeS treated separately, with their own margins | Merged into a single Information Technology Services category |
| Margin | Category-specific, materially higher | 15.5%, unified |
| Transaction value threshold | ₹300 crore | ₹2,000 crore |
| Block period | Shorter | Five years for IT services |
| Threshold testing | Recurring | Tested in the first year of the block only |
| Approval | — | Rules-based and automated |
A separate safe harbour was also introduced for certain data centre services.
Why this is not a small change
Two of those rows change who the regime is even for.
The threshold moved by a factor of nearly seven. A large population of mid-size and large GCCs was structurally excluded from safe harbour under the ₹300 crore ceiling and never had reason to look at it again. That exclusion has gone. A conclusion reached against the old threshold carries no weight against the new one.
The block runs five years, tested once. Certainty for one year is administratively useful. Certainty for five, with the revenue test applied only at the start, is a genuinely different commercial proposition — it takes transfer pricing off the table for a planning horizon rather than a filing season.
The practical consequence: almost every GCC in Bengaluru that decided against safe harbour before April 2026 decided it on facts that no longer apply.
The part the coverage skips
A lower prescribed margin is widely reported as a saving. It is not, by itself.
Safe harbour sets a margin you must declare at or above in order to get certainty. It does not reduce your tax to that level — it sets a floor.
So:
- If your defensible arm's length margin is above 15.5%, electing is straightforwardly attractive: you get certainty at a margin no worse than you would have argued for.
- If your defensible margin is genuinely below 15.5%, electing means declaring more profit than a transfer pricing study would support, and paying tax on the difference. That is the price of the certainty, and for some GCCs it is a real price.
The margin coming down widens the set of GCCs for whom electing makes sense. It does not make electing correct for all of them. That is an arithmetic question on your own cost base, and it has an answer.
What you give up
The right to argue.
An election accepts the prescribed margin for the covered transactions. The comparables analysis, the disputes over what belongs in the cost base, and the appeal route all fall away with it.
That is the whole trade: certainty and no litigation, for a margin you did not negotiate. Whether it is a good trade turns on two things —
- how far your defensible margin sits below the prescribed one; and
- what your dispute history has actually cost you, in fees, in management time, and in cash locked up pending resolution.
Groups that have been through a full transfer pricing cycle to tribunal usually value the second far more highly than groups that have not.
Safe harbour, or an advance pricing agreement
Both buy certainty. They are not substitutes.
| Safe harbour | Advance pricing agreement | |
|---|---|---|
| How | Election by filing, against a prescribed margin | Negotiated for your specific facts |
| Speed | Fast, rules-based | Considerably longer to conclude |
| Scope | Specified transaction types, within thresholds | Can reach arrangements safe harbour does not |
| Margin | Prescribed | Negotiated |
The 2026 changes make safe harbour viable for a much larger group, which shifts where the line between the two sits — but an APA remains the route where the arrangement is unusual, the value added in India is high, or the margin question is genuinely contested.
The decision, on your numbers
- Compute the actual margin the entity earns on its current cost base.
- Establish what margin a transfer pricing study would defend — which is not the same number.
- Test eligibility against the ₹2,000 crore threshold, remembering it is tested in the first year of the block.
- Price the difference between your defensible margin and 15.5%, over five years.
- Set that against what certainty is worth to you, given your dispute history.
Step 2 is the one most groups have not done recently and cannot skip, because without it the comparison has no left-hand side.
For how this sits alongside the other questions a captive faces, see GCC and captive unit taxation.
This is a working reference, not the statute. For anything you are relying on, confirm the notified rule text directly.